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Abstract
The Turing Machine is the paradigmatic case of computing machines, but
there are others, such as Artificial Neural Networks, Table Computing, Relational-
Indeterminate Computing and diverse forms of analogical computing, each of
which based on a particular underlying intuition of the phenomenon of comput-
ing. This variety can be captured in terms of system levels, re-interpreting and
generalizing Newell’s hierarchy, which includes the knowledge level at the top
and the symbol level immediately below it. In this re-interpretation the knowl-
edge level consists of human knowledge and the symbol level is generalized into
a new level that here is called The Mode of Computing. Natural computing
performed by the brains of humans and non-human animals with a developed
enough neural system should be understood in terms of a hierarchy of system
levels too. By analogy from standard computing machinery there must be a
system level above the neural circuitry levels and directly below the knowledge
level that is named here The mode of Natural Computing. A central question
for Cognition is the characterization of this mode. The Mode of Computing
provides a novel perspective on the phenomena of computing, interpreting, the
representational and non-representational views of cognition, and consciousness.
Keywords: Mode of Computing, Table Computing, Relational-Indeterminate
Computing, Artificial versus Natural Computing, Representation,
Interpretation and Consciousness, Limitations of Church Thesis
1lpineda@unam.mx
Preprint submitted to Cognitive Science October 8, 2019
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
10
55
9v
2 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 5 
Oc
t 2
01
9
1. Cognition and Representation
Cognition is the study of mental processes, such as perception, thought,
attention and memory. It has been with us since the Greeks, certainly since
Aristotle –e.g., (Shields, 2016)– but in current times is understood as the study
of the mind in terms of information processes or, more specifically, as compu-
tational processes. This use was introduced with the Turing Machine (TM) in
1936 (Turing, 1936) when a formal or mechanical notion of computation was
made available. The potential scope of computing machinery for modeling the
mind was stated explicitly by Turing with the presentation of the Imitation
Game, better known as the Turing Test, and with his expectation that digital
computers will eventually compete with humans in all purely intellectual fields
(Turing, 1950).
The study of cognition within a computing paradigm made it possible to
talk and study representations within a firm materialist setting in opposition
to speculative or introspective methods, that were not scientific, and also in
opposition to behaviorism, that did not regard representations as genuine ob-
jects of study. Chomsky made the proposal explicit with the introduction of
syntactic structures (Chomsky, 1957) and his refutation of Skinner’s Verbal Be-
havior (Chomsky, 1959). More generally, the representational view of cognition
was extensively argued by Fodor who proposed that the object of cognition
was a mental language, the Language of Thought (LOT) or Mentalese, with a
syntactic or compositional structure and a propositional and representational
character (Fodor, 1975), that was inspired in the TM directly.
A representation is understood in Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a symbolic
structure that is manipulated by the TM. This use was made explicit in the so-
called Knowledge Representation Hypothesis which states that the knowledge
exhibited by a computational process can be considered representational if its
structural ingredients can be rendered as propositions with a linguistic charac-
ter, that are also causal and essential of the behavior exhibited by the compu-
tational agent (Smith, 1985). This hypothesis underlies the AI distinction be-
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tween representational or symbolic versus non-representational or sub-symbolic
systems. In the former, knowledge is expressed through declarative languages
(e.g., logical or functional) and can be reasoned about, whereas in the latter
knowledge is meant to be used directly (e.g., when skills are deployed) and it is
expressed through opaque structures such as neural networks or through specific
algorithms and other structures that cannot be rendered as sets of propositions.
However, this distinction is not reflected in the structural ingredients of
the TM: all knowledge is represented as strings of symbols on the tape or the
memory, and the algorithm is codified in the transition table of the finite-state
control. It is possible to regiment the information to make it more declarative or
use opaque structures, depending of the task and particular requirements, but in
the end all representations are processed by the basic symbolic manipulation op-
erations of the TM, and the distinction of the symbolic versus the sub-symbolic
is not in the machine but rather a product of human interpretation.
This take us to a second sense of representation that refers to the mental
object resulting from interpreting words and sentences or other kinds of infor-
mation on the machine’s tape or presented to the mind through perception.
Representing in this latter sense is to ascribe meaning to the objects of inter-
pretation, allowing the agent to be aware, understand and be conscious. This
sense of “meaning” includes lexical and compositional semantics as well as the
interpretation of representations in relation to a context of use, considering in-
dexicals, intentions, beliefs, and desires. It also includes the contribution to the
interpretation of knowledge about the domain, common sense knowledge and,
more generally, the whole of the conceptual and emotional perspective of the
interpreter towards the representational object and, through such an object, to
the world. People make such semantic attribution but the Knowledge Repre-
sentation Hypothesis is not committed to whether or not computational agents
make it too.
The distinction of these two senses of representation can be seen in terms of
system levels. Complex phenomena or devices can be studied at different levels
of abstraction or granularity, such that each level has its own theoretical terms
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Figure 1: Newell’s main system levels
and laws of behavior, and the phenomena at each level can be studied indepen-
dently of other levels. For the case of digital computers Newell distinguished,
from bottom to top, the physical phenomena, the device, the electronic circuits,
the logic circuits, the register transfer or computer architecture levels, with the
symbol and the knowledge levels at the top of the hierarchy (Newell, 1982). A
simplified version of Newell’s levels collecting the hardware levels together is
illustrated in Figure 1.
The Turing Machine proper is defined at the symbol level, where symbolic
manipulation takes place, and reduces to all the levels below, down to the phys-
ical phenomena. Meaning, on its part, belongs to the knowledge level. Newell
stated that the knowledge level emerges from but is not reducible to the sym-
bol level. He also sustained that the medium of this level is knowledge itself
and its only rule of behavior is what he called the Principle of Rationality. He
–in conjunction with Simon– also postulated the Physical Symbol System Hy-
pothesis sustaining that a system of grounded symbols provides the necessary
and sufficient condition to generate general intelligence (Newell & Simon, 1976).
This latter hypothesis refers also to the symbolic manipulation performed at the
symbol level. From Newell and Simon’s claims it can be elicited that the knowl-
edge level holds the representations that result from interpreting the structures
at the symbol level, thus digital computers can understand and be conscious.
However, it is not necessary to subscribe to such claims by simply holding
that the knowledge level contains the interpretations ascribed to symbolic struc-
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tures by people. Hence, in the present re-interpretation of Newell’s hierarchy all
levels from the symbol one down to the physical phenomena are implemented
in machines, but the knowledge level is human knowledge.
An alternative system level hierarchy was proposed by Marr (Marr, 1982).
This has three levels which are, from top to bottom, the computational or
functional, the algorithmic and the implementational. The first refers to the
specification of the mathematical function that models the mind’s faculty that
is the objet of study, such as vision or language; this is human knowledge and the
top level in Marr’s hierarchy corresponds to the knowledge level in the present
reinterpretation of Newells hierarchy. The algorithmic level is constituted by
the computer programs or algorithms that compute the function properly and
correspond to the symbol level. Finally, the bottom level includes all hardware
and software aspects that sustain the algorithmic level, but are contingent to
the particular computations, such as the programming language in which the
algorithm is codified, or the particular computer in which it is run.
From a third perspective, the sense of representation at the knowledge level
corresponds to the one contested by Searle in the story of the Chinese Room, in
which an English speaking person, who does not understand Chinese, answers
nevertheless questions in Chinese by following instructions and data, without
been aware of the meaning of the questions and their answers (Searle, 1980).
In terms of the hierarchy of systems levels, all operations of such individual are
performed at the symbol or algorithmic level, thus such machine represents in
the symbolic sense but is not aware or conscious because it does not do so at
the knowledge level. Searle dubbed this latter view weak AI in opposition to
the view that computers can represent at the knowledge level, that Searle refers
to as strong AI.
On a more basic level, the distinction between the two senses of represen-
tation is already present in the definition of the Turing Machine. The machine
maps strings of symbols on the tape in the initial state of the computation to
strings in the final state without being aware what such strings mean. This is a
purely mechanical process but the strings are interpreted by people in relation to
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a well-defined set of interpretation conditions, as stressed by Boolos and Jeffrey
(Boolos & Jeffrey, 1989). The TM manipulates units of form (i.e., the symbols
on the tape) but human interpreters understand the units of content or concepts
represented by such units of form. A computation involves these two aspects
always: the device or natural phenomenon that maps inputs into outputs and
the agent that makes the interpretation or the semantic attribution.
The Turing Machine is a theoretical device that models all digital comput-
ers –which are the product of the inventive activity of people– and constitutes
a universal model of artificial or engineered computing. In this mode of com-
puting the machine and the interpreter are different entities in opposition to
natural computing in which the machine that performs the mechanical or phys-
ical process and the interpreter that assigns meanings and understands is the
same individual.
The capability of manipulating symbols in natural computing and the ability
to represent or being conscious are two aspects of the same phenomenon, and
as Turing Machines do not have this latter capability themselves, such model of
computing cannot fully capture the phenomena of natural computing. Hence,
there have to be forms of computing that are more powerful than the one ren-
dered by the Turing Machine, at least in this aspect.
The attribution of meaning to computing systems should also be seen in
relation to whether subjects of study are actual mechanisms, such as robots,
or whether computers are used for developing and testing cognitive models. In
the former, and considering that TMs do not ascribe meaning, such devices
are similar to standard machinery –i.e., radios, TVs, etc.– which are unaware
of the meanings of the signals they manipulate for human consumption. In
the latter, computers are unaware of the meaning of the representations that
they are supposed to model too, but the theorists who devise such models
interpret and attribute meanings to such processes. So, once again, computer
systems implement cognitive models at the symbol level but interpretation and
representation belong to the knowledge level which resides in the mind of human
experimenters.
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2. Connectionism and alternative notions of Computing
The Turing Machine articulates Turing’s particular intuition of the phe-
nomenon of computing. Turing’s model reflects clearly the behavior of a human
computer making calculations on a piece of graph paper with the purpose of
mapping arguments into values of mathematical functions. In his model sym-
bols are written and erased in individual cells with a pencil and rubber, that
can be seen as local scanning devices, and the finite state control with the tran-
sition table are held in the human mind. Turing’s underlying intuition is often
identified, implicitly or explicitly, with the phenomena of computing itself. This
owes itself to historical reasons for before the TM there were very few and not
fully articulated notions of computing. However, the phenomena of the mind is
much richer and varied than manipulating symbol either for making arithmetic
calculations or linguistic inferences, and there may be alternative underlying
intuitions of what is computing, specially natural computing.
An effort in such direction was the Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP)
program or Connectionism, that holds that intelligence emerges from the inter-
actions of large numbers of simple processing units, and that symbolic systems
or TMs have failed to model appropriately most mind processes, such as per-
ception, memory, language and thought –see the Preface of Rumelhart’s text
(Rumelhart et al., 1986). According to this program, distributed processes
are opposed to Turing Machines in the relation between units of memory –
and the units of form stored in them which are the instance symbols of the
TM’s alphabet– and the units of content or the concepts that such structures
represent: in TMs this relation is one-to-one, while in distributed systems is
many-to-many (Hinton et al., 1986). Thus, while in the TM basic concepts
are represented in local memory regions that are independent of the memory
regions allocated to other basic concepts, the memory units used in distributed
concepts may overlap in arbitrary ways; for instance, a particular neuron can
contribute to the representation of more than one concept, and a concept may
share neurons with other concepts. In addition, distributed representations can
7
generalize and the extension of the represented concept may contain individuals
that were not considered when the representation was originally formed if they
are similar enough to other individuals in such extension. This latter effect
cannot be expected in local representations. These intuitions have been very
productive as can be seen in the impact of current deep artificial neural-networks
(ANNs).
Whether symbolic and connectionist systems are essentially different models
of computing has been subject of intense debate. Fodor and Pylyshyn pointed
out the limitations of ANNs to express syntactic structure and their capability
to hold information as standard memories (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). ANNs
implement transfer functions that are useful for classification and prediction,
for instance, but it is not possible to represent the syntactic structure of natural
or formal languages. Neither is it possible to store information in ANNs that
would be otherwise represented in memory, such as a data-base of a bank’s
clientele.
However, both the Mentalese and connectionist systems are meant as rep-
resentational in opposition to eliminativism which denies representations alto-
gether, as stressed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). The
difference is that in symbolic representations meanings are ascribed to strings
and sequences of strings by composition, while in connectionist systems interpre-
tations emerge from the collective operation of the units in the network. Fodor
and Pylyshyn granted that connectionist systems could implement the Men-
talese –the object of cognition proper– that emerges from the workings of the
natural neural networks or the brain. This relation has been explained in terms
of system levels, but using Marr’s Functional, Algorithmic and Implementation
levels (Marr, 1982).
Hence, LOT stands at the functional level and the ANNs at the algorithmic
one, and a great deal of effort has been made to reduce the language of thought
to network implementations although with very limited success –e.g., (Chalmers,
1990; LeCun et al., 1998, 2015). Advocates of the connectionist side have also
argued that these systems are representations in their on right and should be
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Figure 2: Mentalese and its implementation in ANNs
thought of at the functional level (Rueckl, 1991), but this debate seems to
stand in a dead-end to the present date. The relation between the Mentalese
and connectionist systems admitted by Fodor and Pylyshyn in terms of Marr’s
hierarchy of system levels is illustrated in Figure 2.
However, connectionism and ANNs deviated from the original program in
practice because ANNs are specified as Turing-computable functions, imple-
mented with standard data-structures and algorithms, and run in standard
digital computers, thus ANNs are TMs.2 Furthermore, if the claim is that
TM representations are local but practical implementations of ANN use local
memory then the distributed property is only simulated but not actual.
This distinction can also be seen in terms of system levels (using the pro-
posed reinterpretation of Newell levels): the interpretation of the ANNs and
connectionist systems is expressed at the knowledge level, where human inter-
preters see ANNs as distributed representations, but their implementation as
standard programs is carried on at the symbol level where all representations
are local. For these reasons ANNs can be best thought of as virtual machines
that use the TM as the actual computing engine.
2It has also been shown that every TM can be expressed as a recurrent neural-network
and these are equivalent formalisms in relation of the set of functions that can compute
(Siegelmann & Sontag, 1995; Sun et al., 1992)
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Figure 3: Computational Quadrants
3. Cognition without Representation
The observation that representations at the knowledge level are absent in
machines and cannot be inspected or analyzed in animals or people directly,
as in behaviorism, led to the proposal that representations can be dispensed
with altogether. This view was made explicit in AI by Brooks (Brooks, 1991) in
conjunction with the introduction of the so-called embedded architectures for
modeling bio-inspired robotic mechanisms. This program was carried through
specific algorithms and ANNs but now under the assumption that such models
were not representational. Brooks’s proposal introduced a new view on the rep-
resentational and symbolic status of AI formalisms, in addition to strong AI,
weak AI and sub-symbolic systems, as illustrated in Figure 3. The latter view
presupposes either that the knowledge level consists of a continuous interpreta-
tion process –which does not produce representations– or is absent altogether
in both computer systems and humans using such systems.
Brooks’s proposal was akin to strong currents of opinion in biological dis-
ciplines and psychology which emphasize the importance of the body and the
interaction with the environment or the ecology. These views are also non-
representational and, in conjunction with embedded systems, gave rise to the
so-called Embodied Cognition (i.e., (Anderson, 2003)). A form of this movement
embraced the cybernetics tradition that cognition can be modeled from a control
and dynamic systems perspective giving rise to the so-called Enactivism (Froese
& Ziemke, 2009). The Embodied, Embedded, Ecological and Enactivist ap-
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proach has gained considerable momentum in recent years and has been dubbed
E4-Cognition.
This latter movement, specially in the form of enactivism, holds explicitly
that the Turing Machine is limited for capturing mental phenomena. This re-
sembles the connectionist claim of the early eighties but unlike the PDP pro-
gram, E4-Cognition does not propose a computing engine based on an alterna-
tive to Turing’s underlying intuitive notion. For this reason the E4 movement
adds to other traditional disciplines that study cognition from a descriptive
perspective outside of the computing paradigm, such as the neurosciences, psy-
chology, linguistics, philosophy of mind, anthropology, biology, and possible
others. These disciplines can produce great insights into the workings of the
mind and have potentially high-impact applications. However, they shift the
question that initiated the computing view of cognition when the Turing Ma-
chine was made available, that focused on modeling the information processing
engine that was causal and essential to mental phenomena. Without a comput-
ing engine the latter question is beyond the scope of E4-Cognition and other
descriptive disciplines.
In the same way as Connectionism, E4-Cognition pointed out the limita-
tions of AI to scale up for modeling perception, thought, language and memory.
And indeed, the observation is fair giving the current state and prospects of
current computational models of mental processes. Despite the great success of
AI in some aspects, such as classification, prediction and diagnosis, which has
been achieved in some domains with deep-learning neural networks and machine
learning in general, the mental competence of today’s most sophisticated pro-
grams and robots is very limited –i.e., when it is compared with humans and
other animals with a developed enough nervous system. In particular, the study
of diverse aspects of consciousness can be addressed in such disciplines but AI
systems cannot be aware or conscious. However, the challenge is not to AI but
most fundamentally to the computing paradigm and hence to Cognition based
on the Turing Machine. Hence, the dilemma is either to abandon the computing
paradigm and use computers only as modeling tools, as in any other scientific
11
Figure 4: Dilemma of Cognitive Studies
discipline, or extending the TM to model better the phenomena of Cognition.
This dilemma is illustrated in Figure 4.
4. Table Computing
A third intuitive notion of computing underlying a possible computing ma-
chine consists of representing functions as graphs in a cartesian coordinate sys-
tem or in common tables, and finding the values of arguments by direct inspec-
tion. This form is called here Table Computing (TC). In this representation,
columns correspond to arguments and rows to values, and a function is defined
if every column has one marked cell at the most (i.e., the cell intersecting the
column with one row). If a column does not have a marked cell, the function is
partial and assigns no value to the corresponding argument.
Figure 5 illustrates a table expressing a particular function with domain
{a1, a2, a3, a4} of cardinality n = 4 and range {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7} of car-
dinality m = 7, where the arguments and values in these sets are individual
objects of arbitrary kinds. Every function in the table has a unique index or
identifier k which is indicated in the top row. The function fk in the present
example is f1247 –i.e., k = 1247.
All discrete finite functions with n arguments and m values can be enumer-
ated in this format. The index k of function fk of form k1...kn –i.e., the concate-
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Figure 5: Diagrammatic Representation of Finite Discrete Functions
Figure 6: Order of Tables for Finite Discrete Functions
nation of digits k1 to kn– is a number of n digits in base m+1 such that ki = j if
fk1...kn(ai) = vj and ki = 0 if fk1...kn(ai) is undefined. The order of the functions
in this enumeration is f0 ≤ fk ≤ fm –i.e., f01...0n ≤ fk1...kn ≤ fm1...mn . The
enumeration proceeds by incrementing in one the index from 01...0n to m1...mn
rendering the identifiers of all functions that can be formed with n arguments
and m values.
The set of all tables for representing functions of n arguments and m values
can be enumerated. A particular diagonal order is given in Figure 6, where each
cell contains a table of size n×m for m,n ≥ 1.
The number of total and partial functions in table m,n is equal to (m+ 1)n
including the function f0 that assigns no value to all of its arguments. Hence,
the absolute number of the function fk in table n, m is the sum of the functions
in all its previous tables in the order illustrated in Figure 6 added to the number
of the function in its actual table.
The number of tables in diagonal j is j, the diagonal in which table n,m lies is
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diag(n,m) = n+m−1 and the number of table tn,m = max(diag(n,m)−1)+m
–where max(j) is the table with the largest number in diagonal j– as can be
verified directly in Figure 6. Let diag(i) be the diagonal of table i = (n(i),m(i)).
Hence, m(i) = i−max(diag(i)−1) and n(i) = diag(i)−m(i) + 1. The function
max is defined recursively as follows: max(0) = 0 and max(j) = max(j−1)+j.
The computation of n(i) and m(i) only requires the definition of diag. This is
a minimization function as follows: diag(0) = 0 and diag(i) = j such that let
j = 0; increment j until max(j − 1) < i ≤ max(j). The number of function fk
in table tn,m is as follows:
Definition 1. Number of a finite discrete function
Nfk,1 = (k1)10 + 1
else Nfk,tn,m =
∑tn,m−1
i=1 (m(i) + 1)
n(i) + (k)10 + 1
where k = k1...kn, 0 ≤ k1...kn ≤ m1...mn and (k)10 is the conversion of k
into base 10.
All finite discrete functions can be enumerated using Definition 1.3 We as-
sume that there is an infinite supply of memory for the specification of finite
discrete functions of an arbitrary number of arguments and values and that com-
putations are performed instantly, as in the idealization of the Turing Machine.
The index of the function corresponds to its extensional specification, and once
such index is available, the function can be evaluated for all its arguments by
a direct look-up operation on the table or simply by direct inspection of the
index. Hence, computations in the TC format always terminate.
Table Computing is opposed to the Turing Machine in four salient features:
1) while the representation of a function in the TM is intensional –i.e., given by
3The set of total and partial functions for infinite domains is not enumerable. This is
shown by a Cantor’s diagonal argument –e.g., (Boolos and Keffrey, 1989, ch. 2). In the case
of a finite domain and range with cardinality n and m respectively, it is possible to construct
an anti-diagonal function out of a list of n arbitrary functions. The anti-diagonal would not
be in such list, but it would be one among the remaining (m+ 1)n −n functions in the table.
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a description– in Table Computing functions are defined extensionally; 2) while
every TM defines a particular algorithm and computes a particular function, in
TC all functions are computed through the same basic algorithm –i.e., select the
column corresponding to the argument, find the marked cell and select the row
corresponding to the value; if there is no marked cell in the column, the function
is partial and has no value for such argument; 3) while TMs may not halt and
computations are not decidable, the algorithm of TC has a very small number
of computing steps and the computation always terminates; and 4) while TMs
computations are serial and local to the cell inspected by the scanner at each
computation step, in TC cells can be defined as active processing units, allowing
that operations between cells, columns and rows are performed in a fully parallel
fashion.4
The difference between these two forms of computing can be appreciated in
the computation of n and m for a given table i in Figure 6, which in TC is a
direct operation performed by inspection (i.e., select the corresponding column
and row) while computing these values with a TM is an expensive calculation
that requires a large effort and external aids or computing machinery. This
kind of reversibility is a general property of TC as the arguments corresponding
to a given value can also be known by inspection –i.e., selecting the row cor-
responding to the value, finding all marked cells in such row and selecting the
corresponding columns and arguments. The corresponding inverse operation is
not straightforwards in the TM as the inverse function requires its particular
algorithm and not all functions have an inverse precisely because several argu-
ments may have the same value and, in such a case, the inverse would have
arguments for which there is not a uniquely defined value.
The set of functions enumerated with Definition 1 is the set of computable
4This complies with the connectionist desiderata that computations are performed by sim-
ple units that communicate locally with their neighbors in opposition to TM computations
that are serial and local to the cell of the tape inspected by the scanner at each computation
step.
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functions. As Turing Machines are denumerable and each TM computes a par-
ticular function, the set of computable functions are those computed by any
given Turing Machine. Table Computing takes the opposite route, first defining
and enumerating the set of computable functions and then providing a machine
that computes all the functions in such set.
Table Computing has the limitation that most functions are known through
descriptions, have very large and often infinite domains, whose representations
in tables are impractical, and rendering the extension requires the use of TMs
with appropriate algorithms. However, this is not necessarily the case for in-
teractive systems and natural computing, which compute functions with finite
and often small domains, as illustrated by the common use of tables and dia-
grams by people. While the TM is oriented to make complex calculations, Table
Computing is oriented to represent and render direct associations.
5. Relational-Indeterminate Computing
The basic intuition underlying the Turing Machine is that the object of com-
puting is the mathematical function. A consequence of this choice is that all
computations are fully determinate because the relation between the arguments
and values is fixed and the function precedes the algorithm that computes it.
From this perspective what an algorithm does is to render explicitly the knowl-
edge that is implicit in the definition or description of the function that it
computes. Thus, if an algorithm terminates it always produces the same value
for the given argument. Indeed, Turing stated that the deterministic character
of the TM is “rather nearer to practicability than that considered by Laplace
(Turing, 1950, s.5).
However, the mathematical relation can be chosen as the basic object of
computing instead. In this setting evaluating a relation can be construed as
choosing randomly one among all possible values of the given argument. This
latter choice is more general –a function is a relation that has at most one value
for each of its arguments– and augments the expressive power of representa-
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tions. However, computations become indeterminate, the computing engine is
stochastic and the machine has an intrinsic entropy. This form of computing is
called here Relational-Indeterminate.
The entropy of a relational-indeterminate computation can be construed as
the normalized average indeterminacy of all the arguments of the relation that
is the object of computing. A function has one value for all of its arguments and
its entropy is zero. Partial functions do not define a value for all the arguments,
but if the function is known it is also known that such arguments have no values,
and the entropy of partial functions is also zero.
The definition of the computational entropy in this format is as follows: Let
vi be the number of values of an argument (i.e., the marked cells in column i),
xi = 1/vi and n the number of arguments in the relation. In case the relation is
partial and vi = 0 for column i, the corresponding xi = 1. The computational
entropy e –or the entropy of a relation– is defined here as follows:
Definition 2. Computational Entropy
e = −1/n∑ni=1 log2(xi)
Relational-Indeterminate Computing shows that the TM machine is the com-
puting engine with entropy zero, but there are computing engines with entropies
larger than zero (Pineda, 2018).
The computational entropy should be distinguished from the entropy of in-
formation theory and also from thermodynamics entropy, which are computed
all the time when applications of these theories are modeled. This distinction
does not arise in the standard Turing Machine because it is an entropy-free ideal
machine. For this, operations of the TM never loss information, in opposition to
entropic formats whose operations may involve information loss (Pineda, 2018).
The inclusion of the entropy in a theory of computing gives rise to a new
computational trade-off that here is called The Entropy Trade-Off : If the en-
tropy of the machine is very low the computation is pretty determined, being
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the TM the extreme fully determinate case whose entropy is zero; in the other
extreme, if the entropy is very high –i.e., there are very few blanks in the table
representing the relation– the amount of information is very low and compu-
tations are not feasible. However, if the entropy is moderate there is a certain
amount of indeterminacy in the computing engine, that allows multiple behav-
iors, and although operations may involve information loss, computations are
still feasible.
Relational-Indeterminate Computing can be used in conjunction with Table
Computing. This format has the advantage that if every function represents a
concept or unit of content, the superposition of several functions representing
concepts gives rise to a distributed representation but without network or con-
nectionist connotations: marked cells of a table can belong to more than one
function (i.e., the intersection points) and contribute to the representation of
more than one concept. Conversely, a function representing a concept may use
one or more cells that are also used by other functions representing other con-
cepts, satisfying the distributed condition. This format also generalize as func-
tions not included in the original representation can nevertheless be represented
using the cells contributed by other functions (Pineda, 2018). In Relational-
Indeterminate Computing the distributed property is not only simulated –as in
ANNs– but it is an actual property of the computation.
6. The Mode of Computing
There is an open-ended set of intuitive notions of computing underlying
different machines or formalisms, as exemplified by the previous discussion.
This diversity can be seen in terms of the proposed hierarchy of system levels
in which each machine or formalism has a distinctive system level that here is
called The Mode of Computing. This level stands directly below the knowledge
level and above other system levels down to the physical one, as illustrated in
Figure 7.
The mode of computing is the strategy, device or artifact, either artificial or
18
Figure 7: The mode of Computing
a natural phenomenon, that provides the material support and carries on with
the operations that map the argument of a function or a relation into its value.
In the case of the Turing Machine and its equivalent formalisms –the λ-calculus,
Recursive Functions Theory, Abacus computations or the Von Neumann Archi-
tecture, ANNs, etc.– the mode of computing is Algorithmic Computing. This
mode uses well-defined procedures or algorithms that map arguments into values
of the function being computed by symbolic manipulation. Formal languages
and automata theory, the theory of the complexity of algorithms, the theory
of computability and non-computable functions, such as the halting problem,
were developed in relation to algorithmic computing but other modes may have
different salient features.
There are modes that use symbolic manipulation but differ from algorithmic
computing in principled aspects. For instance, Table Computing, which uses
only one fully parallel algorithm that always terminates– hence it can be dis-
pensed with the properties of algorithms in general– or Relational-Indeterminate
Computing which is stochastic and includes the computational entropy.
There are also modes of computing that do not use symbolic manipulation
and perform computations by other means such as analogical and quantum
computing, and even sensors and transducers of diverse sorts. These modes
do not rely on algorithms: electrical analogical computers transform inputs
into outputs almost instantly and there is no sense in which these machines
compute following a well-defined discrete procedure. Quantum computers can
also be thought of as analogical and the use of the term “quantum algorithm”
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is informal for the same reason.
The level of the mode of computing can be partitioned in two or more sub-
levels; for instance, a program written in a declarative language, such as For-
tran, Pascal or C, stands in a sub-level immediately above the same program
but compiled in assembler, which in turns stands above of corresponding binary
program; these levels constitute different levels of abstraction for human con-
sumption but convey a trade-off from top to bottom between expressivity and
efficient computation. Another example are declarative programs in Prolog or
Lisp whose interpreters are written in C, which in turn are expressed in assem-
bler and binary code. Each of this constitutes a sub-level of the symbolic mode.
One more is ANNs which can be thought of as virtual machines above the TM
that performs the actual computations.
For analogical modes –such as quantum computing– there may be a symbolic
interface through which inputs and outputs to the natural phenomenon that
performs the computing process –the actual quantum engine– are presented to
the knowledge level; similarly, standard analogical computers may have a Table
Computing interface through which the inputs and outputs are presented to the
human interpreter.
Different modes of computing can be integrated in complex systems to profit
from their particular strengths. For instance, training current deep-learning
ANNs machines can be thought of as learning a particular table for a very large
domain beforehand and using Table Computing for actual applications, estab-
lishing a trade-off between strong algorithmic effort for learning and efficient
computation for actual use. In the current state of the technology Table Com-
puting is simulated in Turing Machines, but it can also be implemented directly
as a specialized processor or a hardware device for expressing and evaluating
very large tables in a fully parallel fashion.
Similarly, current deep-reinforcement learning algorithms can be integrated
with Relational-Indeterminate Computing to profit from both modes. For in-
stance, the AlphaZero algorithm that recently beat the world champion pro-
grams in the games of chess, go and shogi, trains a deep-learning convolutional
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network from the rules of the games and random play, using the Monte Carlo
tree search algorithm, without additional sources of information (Silver et al.,
2018). The input to the network is a board position s and the output is a vector
of move probabilities with components pa = Pr(a|s) where pa is the probabil-
ity of wining the game if the action a is made at position s. This strategy
can be seen as building a huge relation from chess positions into moves, where
each move has an associated probability. This could be thought of directly in
terms of the Relational-Indeterminate mode. In current implementations this
mode is simulated in the Turing Machine, but it can also be implemented as an
independent specialized fully parallel processor.
Computing, however, does not depend on the mode only: the input and
output must be interpreted in relation to a predefined set of conventions, and
the product of such interpretation is human knowledge at the knowledge level.
If there is computing there is interpretation but also if there is interpretation
there is computing. Consequently computing and interpreting are two aspects
of the same phenomenon.
7. The Mode of Natural Computing
Natural computing is carried on by natural brains of humans and animals
with a developed enough nervous system. The brain, as all complex systems,
should be studied in terms of a hierarchy of system levels. The basic computing
element is the natural neuron, which computes a basic binary function in an
ideal model. The neuron is a device that belongs to a particular system level
above the physical, chemical and biological levels, where the processes sustaining
the neuron take place, and directly below the neural circuitry, which is also a
distinguishable system level, but there must be several system levels between
the neural network and the knowledge level. Although these are not known it is
possible to postulate them hypothetically from several perspectives. One is to
consider brain regions as “organs” oriented to perform particular functions, such
as the pre-frontal or anterior cingulate cortex; however, the relation between
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regions and mental functions is very likely n to n and it is possible to postulate
a level above such organs constituted by the functional organization networks,
such as the Orienting, Alerting and Executive Attention Networks (Posner &
Rothbart, 2007; Posner et al., 2019) which “play a strong role in the regulation
of behavior, both in the control of positive and negative affect and of the sensory
input, and also give rise to consciousness of content and voluntary behavior”
(Posner et al., 2019, p. 139). By analogy with the previous discussion there
must be a system level above the attention networks and directly below the
knowledge level that here is called The Mode of Natural Computing. This mode
corresponds to the “machine” that sustains natural computing.
Although the neuron plays a central role in such mode, the function or the
relation that it computes at the device level is not the function that is computed
by the brain at the mode of natural computing’s level. The difference can be
easily seen through an analogy with electronic systems: a flip-flop –a device
that has two output states (on and off) that is used in memory registers and
the central processing unit’s registers of standard digital computers– computes
a binary function at the electronics circuit level in Newell’s hierarchy, but this
function is different from the one computed at the symbol level, which depends of
the program that is being computed, despite the device employed is the same.
Furthermore, a flip-flop may be used in a standard computer but it can also
be a part of the electronic circuit of a control device, which is not considered
a computer, despite that it computes the same function in all the electronic
circuits that use it. By analogy, a neuron may be a part of a brain circuit
or structure that is involved in interpretation and be involved in the mode of
natural computing, but also a part of other brain structures that may be related
to other functions, such as control, which are not interpreted consciously and
whose functions should not be thought of as computations. Neither the flip-flop
nor the neuron are computers by themselves because this property depends on
the circuit of which these are components, and whether this circuit is subject
of interpretation.
In the world of artifacts invented by people there were control systems long
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before the Turing Machine was introduced and a clear notion of computing was
available; similarly, in natural brains there may be structures performing control
functions that precede the structures that regulate the sensory input, the feeling
of alert and the executive attention. The distinction is again interpretation:
control structures constitute standard machinery that is there to be used but not
to be interpreted, in opposition to computing machinery whose only purpose is
to map input into output representations at the mode of computing that receive
an interpretation and produce knowledge at the knowledge level.
The information with a linguistic and propositional character is presented to
the mind through the symbolic mode, which is the paradigmatic mode of com-
puting. The mentalese is consistent with such mode, and consequently with the
Turing Machine5 but the brain can sustain other modes of natural computing.
For instance, the “imagery mode” constituted by a processor or “mental im-
ages”. In this mode the objects that are presented to the interpretation process
are not linguistic symbols but images (Kosslyn et al., 2006; Shepard & Cooper,
1982). However, imagery has been strongly rejected by the supporters of propo-
sitional representations given rise to the so-called “imagery debate” (Tye, 1991).
The propositional side sustains that the notion of “image” has a concrete char-
acter and appeals to the properties of the perceptual input, but that knowledge
has a fully abstract character and that, in any case, should reflect the com-
puting format directly, independently of the acquisition modality (Pylyshyn,
1973). The mode of computing offers and explanation for this dilemma: lan-
guage and images have different modes, the first symbolic, akin to the MT, and
the second distributed, with a larger relevance for spatial relations, such as the
Relationa-Indeterminate mode, and the interpretation produces knowledge at
5Although Fodor’s position on the relation of the mentalese and the Turing Machine varies:
in The Language of Thought rejects very explicitly that the mind can be a MT (Fodor, 1975),
but in his discussion about the body-mind problem and functionalism states very explicitly
the it is a TM (Fodor, 1981), and is his critique of Connectionism, with Pylyshyn, accepts
that the que el mentalese is inspired in the MT (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988).
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the knowledge level in both cases, which independent of modality.
The system levels involved in the brain are not known but if they where even-
tually discovered a privileged level should correspond to the mode or modes of
natural computing. The description of such level must specify the format of
the input and output configurations and the interpretation conventions. The
orienting, alerting and executive attention networks should play a central role
in such level, and the intensity of consciousness and experience should corre-
spond to the degree of development of such networks; hence, a species lacking
attention networks would not be conscious, and organisms with impaired at-
tention networks would be impaired in its conscious experience accordingly. In
any case, the structures at the level of the Mode of Natural Computing level
should support the production of interpretations and ultimately meanings at
the knowledge level.
8. Artificial versus Natural Computing
Artificial computing based on the Turing Machine supposes the intensive
use of algorithms for representing knowledge, both conceptual and of abilities,
and for performing inferences. Algorithms can be seen as intensional descrip-
tions of the functions they compute whose purpose is simply to make explicit
the extension of such functions. Computings proceeds serially, supported by a
local scanner that inspects the memory –which consists of a “passive recipient”–
according to the structural ingredients of the TM. Computations are determin-
istic and are performed with great precision and at a high speed. Computations
are normally performed “forwards” –from arguments to values– in opposition to
the inverse ones –from values to arguments– because not all functions have an
inverse and the calculations procedures may be very different from the original
function.
However, we can ask how natural is that the mind uses algorithms, which in
the end are a human invention, and how much informations in the mind or the
brain is expressed extensionally. People are very limited to making extensive
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Figure 8: Artificial versus Natural Computing
algorithmic calculations, and whenever we make them we need external aids
and computing machinery. The information presented to living entities through
perception is often extensional, and is plausible that a good deal of it is stored
and processed in this form. Also, the amount of information and the structure
of the brain suggest the use of highly distributed formats, with certain level of
indeterminacy, that memory is active and fundamentally associative, and that
computing is performed in parallel.
Natural computing, in addition, requires to perform inverse computations
frequently: to recognize an object from its sensitive properties, or to diagnose
the causes of an event from its effects, often with uncertainty and indetermi-
nacy. For this, it is plausible that natural computing uses formats that allow
to establishing inverse associations, from values to arguments, very efficiently.
ANNs have these properties to certain extent and reflect natural computing, but
the need to simulate them in TMs limits significantly their explanatory power.
Table and Relational-Indeterminate Computing, on their part, have such prop-
erties directly and may model better some aspects of natural computing.
These considerations suggest to distinguish artificial or engineering comput-
ing versus natural computing in four salient dimensions: algorithmic capacity;
memory structure; whether they support associative memory; and the amount
of computational entropy, as illustrated in Figure 8. This opposition is informal
and is presented here only as a gross hypothesis of the main dimensions that
may differentiate this form of computing.
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It is also plausible that the brain uses simple algorithms but also other
modes of computing, and that a trade-off between modes is established. This
may be the entropy trade-off, that sustains that a moderate amount of entropy
allows rich expressivity, effective and efficient computing, but at the cost of some
indeterminacy of behavior and information loss, as described in Section 5.
9. Implications for Church Thesis
Church Thesis, also known as Church-Turing Thesis, states that the Tur-
ing Machine is the most powerful computing machine that can be ever defined.
Turing proposed that his machine models appropriately the notion of effective
calculability, which corresponds to the calculations that human computers can
perform given enough time and material resources, without appealing to intu-
ition; he also showed that the functions computed by the TM are equivalent to
those expressed in the λ-Calculus, which are also the recursive functions, and
that this set is the full set of computable functions.6
The thesis establishes 1) the equivalence of all formalisms or machines that
compute the full set of computable functions and 2) the impossibility of com-
puting non computable functions, such as the halting problem. This consists
on predicting whether an arbitrary TM or computer program will halt –and
find the value for an arbitrary argument or report that such argument has no
value if the function is partial. In case such machine were found it would not
be a TM, and as the TM is the more powerful machine that can ever exists by
hypothesis, the halting machine cannot exists at all. Of course, if such machine
were found Church Thesis would be refuted Boolos & Jeffrey (1989). More in-
formally, computable functions are those that have an algorithm and the TM
characterizes all algorithms.
From a formal perspective, the thesis is a mathematical propositions stat-
ing that a function of positive integers is computable if it is recursive and vice
6For a historical and conceptual discussion see, for instance, (Copeland, 2019).
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versa. However, the notion of effective procedure or Turing’s computability has
been extrapolated and the thesis has been interpreted as stating that the TM
can simulate all possible mechanisms, in particular in the forms that Copeland
(Copeland, 2019) calls the Maximality Thesis, sustaining that all functions that
can be generated or performed by machines can be computed by a TM or that
anything that can be calculated can be calculated by a TM; the Simulation
Thesis, holding that Turing’s results imply that the brain, and any physical or
biological system can be simulated by a TM; and, more radically, the Physical
Church-Turning Thesis stating that any physical computing device or any phys-
ical thought experiment that is conceived or designed by any future civilization
can be simulated by a TM. These theses taken together and other similar propo-
sitions are informally called the strong version of Church Thesis stating that the
TM is the most powerful computing machine that can ever exist in any possible
sense.
However, the notion “powerful machine” is problematic in several senses,
starting with the fact that different machines or algorithmic formalisms can
be more powerful or weaker than others in particular aspects, even though all
of them may compute the full set of computable functions. For instance, al-
gorithmic computing assumes a fundamental trade-off between the expressive
power of representations and their tractability, or the possibility of perform a
computation with finite time and memory resources. This trade-off is explicit in
Chomsky’s hierarchy of formal languages that includes, from bottom to top, the
regular languages, the context free languages, the context sensitive languages
and the languages without restrictions of any sort (Hopcroft et al., 2006). Reg-
ular languages have a concrete character and can be computed very efficiently
but can express only very limited abstractions while the languages in the other
extreme can express very deep abstractions but the computational cost can be
very high and cannot be afforded always. The algorithmic mode also assumes
the The Knowledge Representation Trade-Off that states that concrete repre-
sentations can be computed efficiently but have expressivity restrictions and that
abstract representations can very expressive but cannot be computed effectively
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(Levesque & Brachman, 1985; Levesque, 1988). For instance, the consequences
of the knowledge expressed in propositional logic can be found very easily but
if the full expressive power of predicate logic is required the computational cost
may be too high and computations may be unfeasible. Another example is
ANNs that can express and process distributed representations very efficiently
but cannot express syntactic structure and cannot store information such as
standard memories.
Similarly, there are senses in which the algorithmic mode is or can be more
powerful than a Turing Machine. For instance, while theTM is directed to
make complex calculations but is not decidable due to the halting problem, Ta-
ble Computing is oriented to make direct associations and computations always
terminate. Furthermore, while computing a function and its inverse, whenever
it exists, requieres different algorithms, TC computes the inverse function or
a relation directly by inspection using the same algorithm for all inverse func-
tions and relations. Another example is the opposition between the TM and
Relational-Indeterminate Computing: while the former is deterministic the lat-
ter is indeterminate, stochastic and entropic. On its part, analogical computers
are very efficient and computations are performed through the physical phenom-
ena almost instantly but compute specific set of functions, are indeterminate and
have no memory capabilities.
More generally, every mode of computing assumes some fundamental trade-
offs that define the its explanatory capability and its potential applications.
There may be properties of different modes that can be compared directly, such
as the speed or memory capacity of digital versus quantum computers, but
comparing different modes of computing in general is a category mistake.
More fundamentally, the formulation of the standard TM and Church The-
sis is independent of interpretation and computing is conceived as an objective
property of mechanisms. However, the distinguishing propriety of computing
machines in relation to standard machinery is that the former are designed for
expressing and transforming representations to be interpreted by people and
the product of such interpretations is conscious knowledge. Hence, in natural
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computing, interpretation and consciousness are two aspects of the same phe-
nomenon. The characterization of natural computing requires considering these
aspects and the computing engine of natural computing is more powerful than
the TM in this sense too. For all this, the strongest form of Church Thesis,
which states that the TM is the most powerful machine in every possible sense,
is incoherent.
10. The Mode of Computing, Cognition and Consciousness
The mode of computing and the hierarchy of system levels provide a novel
perspective on the representational and non-representational views of cognition.
In the former, the knowledge level holds representations of interpretations of the
objects or processes at the level of the mode of computing but in the latter such
mental objects do not exist.
The ontological status of mental objects at the knowledge level is problem-
atic, but if these objects are postulated at all, a parsimonious criterium about
their nature is considering that they reflect the properties or processes of their
corresponding objects at the level of the mode of computing, for all modes
that are used in natural computing. The algorithmic mode uses symbolic ma-
nipulation whose interpretations at the knowledge level can be thought of as
propositions expressed in the Mentalese. Other symbolic modes, such as Table
Computing and the Relational-Indeterminate, are characterized by the use of
the space as the medium and, in the latter case, by the indetermination of its
structures, thus their interpretations at the knowledge level can be thought of
as images in opposition to propositions with a linguistic character.
In the representational view it needs to be held that mental objects at
the knowledge level require no further interpretation; otherwise, interpretation
would involve an infinite regress. It has to be held as well that human inter-
preters are conscious by the mere fact of having such representations in mind, at
least when such expressions are the focus of attention, including the qualitative,
experiential or phenomenological aspect of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996).
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A further consideration is that mental phenomena is caused by the activity
of the brain, and needs to depend on the physical substratum or medium where
the computing process is carried out –which is causal and essential to the mental
object. Such medium and operations constitute the mode of natural computing.
Thus, in the representational view, cognition and consciousness would depend
on the mode of natural computing. Hence, a fundamental question for this view
is what is the mode of natural computing, that is the cause of consciousness.
Finding such mode and the property that makes interpreters ascribe meanings
to symbols or processes and have subjective experience would equate to solving
the strong problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996). However, this is an open
question for science altogether and there is not or does not seem to be any
plausible answer in sight.
Non-representational views hold, on the other hand, that there are no rep-
resentations at the knowledge level. This can be elicited as claiming either that
the so-called knowledge level consists of a continuous interpretation process of
the objects at the level of the mode of computing or, more radically, that the
knowledge level does not exist at all in both artificial and natural computing.
The interpretative view allows for holding that in natural computing the
knowledge level and the mode of computing fuse in a single level that is causal
to consciousness. If the mode uses a representational structure, such structure
is the actual representation and the operations on it are actual interpretations
that allow the agent to be aware, understand and experience the world. Such
representations would be stable and could be “inspected” in distinctive “mental
states” that could be experimented and being the objects of consciousness.
If there are not stable representational structures at the mode of comput-
ing, such as sub-symbolic systems, the interpretation is performed upon to the
inputs and outputs states of sub-symbolic processes. The interpretation is also
causal to experience and consciousness, but the states last for very brief periods
of time and are too proximal between each other, as the individual pictures of a
movie, which are discrete but displayed a high speed produce a continuous expe-
rience; however, their briefness prevents or resists their “conscious inspection”
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as individual objects.
In both the symbolic and sub-symbolic cases the interpretation allows the
the computational agent to be in a state of alert, be conscious and experience
the world. The quality of the experience would correspond to the mode of natu-
ral computing employed in particular computations, including propositions and
images. Likewise, if the mode is non-representational, the computing process
is the actual interpretation directly. The interpretative view is perhaps more
parsimonious than views holding that there are mental objects, which can be dis-
pensed with altogether, and allows for representational and non-representational
natural modes of computing, that can co-exist coherently.
There remains the view that the knowledge level is absent altogether in both
artificial and natural computing. In this latter view there are no interpretations
and computing becomes an objective property of machinery; however, it could
be ascribed as well to organs, such as the heart or the stomach, control de-
vices (e.g., thermostats, etc.) or even to transducers and sensing devices of all
sorts. Arbitrary physical, chemical or biological phenomena could also be con-
sidered computing machines, including the universe as a whole. In this radical
non-representational view there are not interpretations, neither meanings, nor
consciousness nor experience; computing is detached from interpretation, any
kind of mechanism can be considered a computer, and the notion of computing
becomes rather empty.
In summary, if there is a knowledge level, either understood as constituted by
mental objects or thought of it as the interpretation of the objects or processes
at the level of the mode of computing, there are interpretations, and hence com-
puting. The interpretation is causal to experience, to the ascription of meaning
and to conscious experience. Each mode of natural computing would yield a
particular quality or kind of experience. Experience or awareness would be how
computing with a particular mode feels, for all modes used in natural computing.
The notion of the mode of computing involves that computing, interpreting and
consciousness are three aspects of the same phenomenon; or that consciousness
and experience are the manifestations of computing/interpreting. Interpreting
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is what distinguishes computing machinery from standard machinery. In the
case of artificial computing the process is split in two different entities: the one
that supports a mode of computing and the one who makes the interpretation.
In the case of natural computing the entity that holds the mode of computing
and the one that makes the interpretation is the same individual.
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